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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ALLPHIN REALTY, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16036

WESLEY F. SINE,
Defendant and
Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant,
Allphin Realty, Inc., against Defendant-Respondent, Wesley F.
Sine, for a real estate broker's commission.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable
David K. Winder granted Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the ground that a written memorandum used to satisfy
the Utah Statute of Frauds [UCA 25-5-4(5)] allowing a broker to
bring suit for compensation must contain the sales price of the
property to be sold.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of trial court's
decision granting Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent and Plaintiff-Appellant executed a
memorandum of agreement entitled "Agreement of Commission" (R-43)
dated October 13, 1976 wherein Defendant-Respondent agreed to pay
a commission of $60,000 to Plaintiff-Appellant if the Newhouse
Hotel was sold to one of the persons listed on the agreement or
their associates through the efforts of Plaintiff-Appellant
either directly or indirectly.
Subsequently, on or about May 7, 1977, Plaintiff-Appelland obtained through its efforts an Offer to Purchase signed by
one of the associates of those listed on the Agreement of Commission.

Because of Defendant-Respondent's refusal to cooperate in

consummating a sale, Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit for commission.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court held that the memorandum was not
enforceable because it did not contain the selling price of the
property mentioned in the agreement (R-76).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The agreement sought to be enforced here is an employment contract to pay a commission by a seller to a broker.
Section 25-5-4, UCA, 1953 provides:
In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith: ...
(5)
Every agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation.
In 72 Am.Jur. 2d 805 Section 285, the reason for the
rule is expressed as follows:
"A memorandum is required by the statute of frauds,
not for the purpose of obtaining a contract in writing,
but merely to furnish written evidence, signed by the
party to be charged or his duly authorized representative, of the obligation to be enforced against him.
In other words, a memorandum is not required in order
to make a contract but to evidence in writing that
a contract has been made.
There is, therefore, a
considerable difference between a written contract
and a written memorandum of an oral contract, and
especially is this true so far as the parol evidence
rule is concerned. A written contract is subject to
that rule, but a memorandum of an oral contract may be
shown by parol to be inaccurate or incomplete."
In 72 Am.Jur. 2d 813 Section 295 referring to the form
of a memorandum, it is stated:
"No particular form of language or instrument is
necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing
under the Statute of Frauds, where the statute does not
require that the contract itself be reduced to writing.
A memorandum wholly untechnical in form may be sufficient, and it may consist of any kind of writing, from a
solemn deed down to mere hasty notes or memoranda in
books or papers. A written recognition of the contract,
expressed in one instrument or, in a proper case, in
several writings, may constitute a sufficient memorandum,
notwithstanding that it contains a request for release,
a refusal to perform the contract, or a denial of its
validity ...
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Generally speaking, a memorandum in writing meets
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds that certain
contracts shall be evidenced by writing if it contains
the names of the parties, the terms and conditions of
the contract, and a reasonably certain description of
the subject matter of the contract, and if it is
signed by the party to be charged."
In 80 ALR, 1456 and 1457, in a treatise on the statute
of fraud in cases between sellers and brokers, it is stated:
" ... In construing such statutes with respect to
the deficiency of the writing required thereunder, while
the courts have had in view the consideration that this
statute was intended to protect the land owner from the
imposition of false claims by real estate brokers, and
have therefore held that in order to entitle the broker
to his commission there must be a writing sufficiently
complying with the terms of the statute, whenever it
was necessary to protect the broker from being defrauded
by the land owner they have not failed to place a
liberal construction upon the statute, consistent with
its terms.
So, expressions to the effect that this
statute must not be construed as to enable the land
owner to commit imposition and fraud upon an agent,
where there has been a substantial compliance with the
statute, are not uncommon in the adjudicated cases . . . . "
In an action involving a broker's suit for a commission,
the Utah Supreme Court in the NEY v. HARRISON 299 Pacific 2d
1114 reasoned that the Utah statute simplified this problem and
found that the contract itself need not be in writing but merely
that some note or memorandum be available evidencing the contract
said:
"We are cognizant that decisions of courts have
varied widely as to the sufficiency of writings which
will suffice to meet the Statute of Frauds. Many of
the decisions are explainable on the basis of substantial differences in the statutory provisions and
terminologies, and in factual distinctions. But the
explanation of other decisions lies only in which of
the two policies implicit in the statute the particular
court felt was paramount:
The protection of the landowner from the imposition of spurious claims by real
estate brokers, or the necessity of protecting the
broker, who has rendered a bona fide service, from
being refused just compensation for his work by the
Sponsored bylandowner.
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"In assaying whether the particular writing meets
the requirement of our statute, the problem is considerably simplified if we carefully observe that our
statute, unlike that of many states, does not call for
the contract itself to be in writing; it is enough if
there is 'some note or memorandum thereof' which evidences
the contract.
The instant case appears to come within
the doctrine of Hawaiian Equipment Co. Ltd. v. Eimco
Corp., which approved the rule of the Restatement of
Contracts:
"'A memorandum, in order to make enforceable
contract within the Statute, may be any document or
writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to be
charged * * * which states with reasonable certainty,
"'(a) each party to the contract either by his own
name, or by such a description as will serve to identify him, * * * and
"'(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to
which the contract relates, and
"'(c) the terms and conditions of all the promises
constituting the contract by whom and to whom the
promises are made.'"
Further, this Court in FRITSCH v. HESS, 162 Pacific 70,
where one of the issues before the court was whether certain
letters an? telegrams were sufficient to constitute some note
or memorandum to find a contract of employment, said:
"We find that, so far as the contract of employment
between the plaintiff and the defendant is concerned,
these letters and telegrams are sufficient to constitute 'some note or memorandum thereof in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.'
It
is well settled that no particular form of words is
necessary to comply with this statute, and that almost
any kind of writing will be sufficient if it be signed
by the party sought to be charged and contains the
essential terms of a contract."
In 12 Am.Jur. 2d 806 Section 45, the following comment
is made regarding the Statute of Frauds and agreements between a
broker and seller:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The general rule that the memorandum of a contract required to be in writing by the statute of
frauds must contain the essential elements of the contract so that they may be ascertained from the writing
or writings without a resort to oral evidence applies
to agreements employing brokers to sell or purchase
real estate.
It is held that the writing must unequivocally show the fact of employment of the broker
seeking to recover his commission. The authorization
need not be expressed, yet it may not be inferred from
mere expression of the owner as to the price and terms
of which he will, or desires to, dispose of the property.
The writing should ordinarily state the compensation,
describe the property, and be signed, at least by the
principal, and, in some jurisdictions, by reason of
express statutory requirements, by both parties. The
writing need not, however, in the absence of an express
requirement, state the price to be obtained or any
other of the terms and details of a sale which may be
required to be embodied in a contract for the sale of
property.
In some jurisdictions the statutes require
the writing express, among other things, the period of
time for which the broker's authority is to endure ... "
The necessity of terms of sale in such a memorandum is
also discussed in 80 ALR 1472, as follows:
"The courts are agreed, in the absence of a statute
expressly requiring it, that the writing need not
contain the price to be obtained or other terms or
details of the sale which may be required to be embodied in a contract for the sale of the property ...
"Thus, under the statute of Michigan requiring in
substance an agreement to pay commissions for the sale
of real estate, or a memorandum thereof, to be in
writing, it has been held that the test for determining the sufficiency of the writing is not whether
it contains all of the details necessary to be stated
in an agreement to sell and convey real estate, but
whether, in an action for the commission, the seller
can defend upon the ground that the promise to pay the
commission was not in writing.
Hence, where the
agreement contained a sufficient description of the
property, and the definite promise to pay as commissions
all over and above a designated amount per acre,
though it did not state when and how the balance of
the purchase price should be paid, was held sufficient
under the statute ...
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"And though it did not specify the selling price,
or the terms of the sale, an agreement to pay a certain
amoun~ ~f commission upon the sale of the property,
descrlblng the same, at the time of the sale, was held
sufficient on the theory that while the broker's right
to commission would be contingent upon the owner's
acceptance of a price and terms agreeable to him, where
the owner does accept them (which he in the instant
case did by signing a legal and enforceable land
contract with the prospective purchaser), the fact that
the contract for the payment of commission does not
specify the selling price and terms of the sale is not
material under the statute requiring it to be in
writing.
Greenberg v. Sakwinski (1920) 211 Mich. 498,
179 N. W. 234."
"The holding in Cochran v. Staman (Mich.) supra,
was followed in Badger v. Finlayson (1922) 219 Mich.
660, 189 N. W. 988, in which an agreement merely promising to pay commissions at a designated rate for
services in disposing of the defendant's farm was sustained as against the objection that it did not satisfy
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The court
also, following Greenberg v. Sakwinski (Mich.) supra,
held that the omission of the sale price was immaterial,
saying:
"l'ihen a written agreement to pay a commission
for the sale of real estate is shown, it complies with
the demand of the statute without any further proof as
to the details of the sale.'"
"So, under the Oregon statute, it is held that it
is immaterial that the contract fails to state any sum
which is to be paid for the property; it being sufficient to enable the broker to recover his commission
that the purchaser is willing and ready to purchase at
the price the owner sees fit to ask.
Henderson v.
Lemke (1911) 60 Or. 363, 119 Pac. 482.
"The statute of California requiring an agreement
for the employment of a real estate broker, or a
memorandum thereof, to be in writing, was construed in
Baird v. Lescher (1908) 9 Cal. App. 65, 98 Pac. 49, as
requiring only the authorization to be in writing, and
not all of the terms of the contract of employment; and
it was held that the fact that the agreement, which was
not signed by the owner, contained blank spaces as ~o
the terms upon which the property was to be sold, dld
not make it insufficient memorandum under the statute
(the unsigned agreement was accompanied with a letter,
written by the owner, authorizing the owner to sell the
property)."
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This court in CASE v. RALPH 188 Pacific 640 on page 642
said:
"The statute is in force in a number of the states
of the union, and has by the courts of last resort in
those states frequently been applied.
The courts
generally hold that under such a statute a real estate
broker or agent cannot recover commission for services
rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for
real property unless it appears:
(1)
That there is an
express contract or agreement of authority in which the
terms and conditions of his employment, if any and the
amount of his commission, etc., are stated; (2)
that
such contract be in writing; (3) that in the absence of
such express contract no recovery can be had for the
reasonable value of the services rendered as upon a
quantum meruit, nor for money and time expended for the
use and benefit of the owner of the property ... "
In Case v. Ralph cited above, the Utah Supreme Court
indicated that the contract or memorandum should contain the terms
of employment and the amount of the commission, stating no requirement concerning the terms of sale.
In the case at hand, the parties are clearly identified,
the property to be sold is identified and the terms and conditions of the employment contract are stated in the written memorandum; the memorandum is signed by the party to be charged.
Clearly the terms of employment are unequivocable.

The trial

court takes the position that the terms of the property sale (in
particular the sales price of the property) were required to be
on the employment agreement between the broker and the seller;
however, the law and the cases do not so hold.

CONCLUSIONS
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
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errored in finding that a note or memorandum as required by
25-5-4(5) UCA, 1953, must contain the sale price of the property
being sold.

The memorandum did contain the essential elements of

a contract for the employment of a broker, namely the party to be
charged, the property to be sold, and the commission to be paid.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert E. Froerer
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant
2610 Washington Boulevard
P. o. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
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